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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
recoveries for necessaries, is that the husband is held liable only for the
reasonable value of the services, not for the contract price.)12
Prior to the instant case, the New York decisions have not considered
the question when the suit in which the legal services were rendered was
one for absolute divorce; but when the suits were for limited divorce or
judicial separation two lines of reasoning, a mixture of minority rules al-
ready mentioned, have appeared. When the wife instituted the original
suit, the general principle has been adopted of permitting recovery in a
separate action for counsel fees, where the suit was on reasonable grounds.' 3
But where the wife has defended, the court has held that her counsel may
recover from the husband without proving any justification for defending
the suit, public policy and the effort of the wife to preserve the marriage
being sufficient reasons. 14
In the instant case the original proceeding between the husband and
wife was one for absolute divorce. 1- It is said in the opinion that the rule
would be otherwise where the wife began the divorce suit, no distinction
being made as to whether it was reasonably justified or not. The decision
extends the rule laid down in the separation cases to cases where the wife
was defendant in an action for absolute divorce, but intimates that it would
not be followed where she was plaintiff. Thus in New York there is a
tendency toward adopting the rule and distinctions recognized in Iowa at
the present time. 16  V. C. B. '37.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-INNKEEPER-LIABILITY OF PROPRIETOR FOR IN-
JURY TO OCCUPANT.--The plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries
sustained by a fall in her apartment kitchenette. The plaintiff was standing
on her tiptoes attempting to turn on the kitchen light, balancing against a
drainboard with her left hand, when the drainboard suddenly collapsed,
precipitating plaintiff to the floor whereby she sustained a fracture of her
right arm. The evidence showed that plaintiff's apartment was one of
many located in the "Hotel Claremont," operated under a hotel keeper's
license; that the plaintiff with her two daughters occupied the apartment
under an oral contract for a monthly rental, payable weekly; that the de-
fendant controlled the entire building, fixtures and equipment, furnished the
light, heat, water, telephone and janitor service; that the defendant con-
12 Sprayberry v. Merk (1860) 30 Ga. 81, 76 Am. Dec. 637; Bord v. Stubbs
(1899) 22 Tex. Civ. App. 242, 54 S. W. 633.
13 Naumer v. Gray (1898) 28 App. Div. 529, 51 N. Y. Supp. 222.
14 Hays v. Ledman (1899) 28 Misc. Rep. 575, 59 N. Y. Supp. 687.
15 Though no point is made of it, this decision necessarily involved hold-
ing that the statute allowing suit money to be granted by the court in the
divorce action was not an exclusive method of obtaining it. This again is
contra to the weight of authority, Hamilton v. Salisbury (1908) 133 Mo.
App. 718, 114 S. W. 563; Zent v. Sullivan, supra., note 6, but it had already
been decided that the New York statute was not an exclusive remedy for
the attorney in separation suits. Naumer v. Grey, supra, note 13.
16 See Sherwin v. Maben (1899) 78 Ia. 467, 43 N. W. 292; Gordon &
Belsheim v. Brackey et al. (1909) 143 Ia. 102, 120 N. W. 83.
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sidered himself obligated to keep the buildings and apartments in habitable
condition; that the defendant retained a duplicate key to the apartment;
that transient guests were received in the single-room apartments; that bills
were presented upon which plaintiff's indebtedness was described as "room
rent." The court submitted the case to the jury upon the theory that if
the plaintiff was occupying the apartment as a lodger as distinguished from
a tenant, and the jury so found, a verict for plaintiff would be proper. The
jury found for plaintiff. On appeal: Affirmed. There was sufficient evi-
dence in the record to sustain the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was
a lodger and not a tenant. Marden v. Radford (Mo. Sup. 1935) 84 S. W.
(2d) 947.
It may be necessary in the determination of a landlord's liability to ascer-
tain the relationship of the parties." The functions and purposes of hotels
change with the period, and ancient definitions must therefore be accepted
with reservations. 2 The distinction in law between a tenant and a lodger
is a substantive one. The tenant may maintain ejectment and trespass, the
lodger may not. Upon the goods of a lodger his landlord has a lien for
unpaid rent; upon those of a tenant he has no lien. In the case of the
tenant, the landlord has divested himself of the possession of the premises
and the tenant acquires an interest in the real estate, giving him the right
to maintain ejectment or trespass against his landlord. The lodger has
merely the use of the room or rooms, the landlord retaining general control.8
The very fact that the arrangement did not contemplate accommodating the
plaintiff alone, but allowed her to bring in her daughters, whether as lodgers
or as sharers of expenses, is enough of itself to show that there was no such
agreement as is commonly made between a guest and an innkeeper.4 It is a
matter of general knowledge, of which the courts will take judicial notice,
that innkeepers charge according to persons as well as according to rooms.5
Our modern apartment houses, often styled hotels, whose rooms, suites, or
flats are let furnished or unfurnished, even though transient people occa-
sionaly lodge there, cannot be reckoned as inns.6
The issue, however, was for the jury and its finding was conclusive.7 For
this reason the decision is on sound ground.8
I Wolk v. Pittsburgh Hotel Co. (1925) 284 Pa. St. 545, 131 Atl. 537.
2 Friedman v. Shindlers Prairie House (1928) 230 N. Y. Supp. 45, 224
App. Div. 232; Dixon v. Robbins (1927) 246 N. Y. 169, 158 N. E. 63, 53
A. L. R. 986.
3 Carroll v. Cooney (1933) 116 Conn. 112, 163 At. 599; Mathews v.
Livingston (1912) 86 Conn. 263, 85 At. 529; Dewar v. Minneapolis Lodge
(1923) 155 Minn. 98, 192 N. W. 358, 32 A. L. R. 1012; Bradley v. Bayles
(1881) 8 Q. B. 195. See also, Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, Vol. 1 p. 94.
4 Roberts v. Case Hotel Co. (1919) 175 N. Y. Supp. 123, 106 Misc. Rep.
481; Schouler, Bailments, 3rd Ed. 278.
5Ibid. See cases supra, note 4.
G Ibid.
7 Carroll v. Cooney (1933) 116 Conn. 112, 163 Atl. 599. Mathews v.
Livingston (1912) 86 Conn. 263, 85 At. 529; Roberts v. Case Hotel Co.
(1919) 175 N. Y. Supp. 123, 106 Misc. Rep. 481; Fox v. Windmere Hotel
Co. (1916) 30 Col. App. 162, 157 Pac. 820; Masserly v. Mercer (1891) 45
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There is another angle to the problem. The parties under the contract
considered the defendant obligated to make repairs. 9 That a contract may
be construed according to the interpretation put upon it by the parties is
a well-established principle.10 Whether a covenant to repair imposes upon
the lessor a liability in tort for personal injuries resulting from the breach
thereof, at the suit of the lessee, is a matter of divided judicial opinion.
Missouri joins with the majority view in denying recovery."' The minority
doctrine has won a notable adherent in the American Law Institute.' 2
The lessee can only recover the cost of the repairs.'3 Liability in tort is an
incident to occupation or control,'4 and by preponderant opinion, occupation
Mo. App 327; Shearman v. Iroquois Hotel Co. (1903) 85 N. Y. Supp. 365,
43 Misc. Rep. 217; Cedar Rapids Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co. (1928)
205 Iowa 736, 218 N. W. 510, 56 A. L. R. 1098.
8 Kincaid v. Birt (Mo. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 97; Lackey v. Wilder (Mo.
1931) 33 S. W. (2d) 1011; Cook v. Sears Roebuck Co. (Mo. 1934) 71 S. W.
(2d) 73; Goldman v. Indemnity Co. (Mo. 1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 866; Greaves
v. Kansas City Orpheum Co. (Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d) 228.
9 Marden v. Radford, (Mo. Sup. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 947 1. c. 958
and 959.
10 Clayton v. Wells (1930) 324 Mo. 1176, 26 S. W. (2d) 969; Diehl v. A. P.
Green Fire Brick Co. (1923) 299 Mo. 641, 253 S. W. 984; Summer v. Sheysor
(1933) 273 Ill. App. 588; Biltmore Land Co. v. Monroe's Estate (1935)
271 Mich. 125, 260 N. W. 135; Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Mo.
1935) 81 S. W. (2d) 313; Thomsen v. Riedel (1935) 114 N. J. Law 379,
176 Atl. 701; Claiborne-Reno Co. v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours Co. (1935)
77 F. (2d) 565; Belk x. George Washington Ins. Co. (1935) 208 N. C. 267,
180 S. E. 63; Thelin v. Marwitz (1934) 277 Ill. App. 535; Orlando Orange
Grove Co. v. Hale, (Fla. 1935) 161 So. 284.
"* Collins v. Goetz (1931) 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397; Turner v.
Ragan (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 809; Glenn v. Hill (1908) 210 Mo. 291,
109 S. W. 27, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699; Kohule v. Paxton (1916) 268 Mo.
463, 188 S. W. 155; Mathews v. Galbraith (Mo. App 1922) 238 S. W. 554;
Hunkins v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. (1933) 169 At. 3; Chambers v. Lowe (1933)
169 Atl. 912; Minneker v. Gardiner (1933) 47 Ohio App. 203, 191 N. E.
793; Tuttle v. Gilbert Mfg. Co. (1887) 145 Mass. 169, 13 N. E. 465; Miles
v. Janvrin (1907) 196 Mass. 431, 82 N. E. 708, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378;
Davis v. Smith (1904) 26 R. I. 129, 58 Atl. 630, 66 L. A. R. 478; Cavalier
v. Pope (1905) 2 K. B. 757; Cavalier v. Pope (1906) A. C. 428; Cameron
v. Young (1908) A. C. 176; Carrol v. Club of Boston (1923) 243 Mass. 380,
137 N. E. 656; Dustin v. Curtis (1907) 74 N. H. 266, 67 Atl. 220, 11 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 504; Brady v. Klein (1903) 133 Mich. 422, 95 N. W. 557, 62
L. R. A. 909. See also, cases in 8 A. L. R. 766, and 68 A. L. R. 1194.
There are decisions to the contrary but they speak the voice of a minority:
Napier v. Pool (1929) 39 Ga. App. 187, 146 S. E. 783; Ross v. Haner (1922)
244 S. W. 231; Barren v. Liedloff (1905) 95 Minn. 474, 104 N. W. 289;
Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1914) 158 Wis. 626, 149 N. W. 489, L. R. A.
1916 F. 1101. See also cases in 8 A. L. R. 766 and 68 A. L. R. 1194.
12 American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, Sec. 357.
13 Goodal v. Deters (1929) 121 Ohio State 432, 169 N. E. 443; Priver v.
Young (1923) 62 Cal. App. 405, 216 Pac. 966; Block v. Balden Realty Co.(1927) 223 N. Y. Supp. 518, 129 Misc. Rep. 906; Rowan v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co. (1920) 79 N. H. 409; Marks v. Citron (1923) 243 Mass. 454, 137 N. E.
647; Karsch v. Laeffle (1912) 168 Mo. App. 414, 151 S. W. 790.
14 See cases supra, note 13.
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and control are not reserved through an agreement that the lessor will
repair.15 The power of control necessary to raise the duty implies some-
thing more than the right or liability to repair the premises; it implies the
power to admit people to the premises and the power to exclude people from
them.' 6 The question as to when and to what extent a recovery for negli-
gence may be based upon the breach of a contract obligation is one of the
moot questions in the law." It has been said with much force that the
ground of liability upon the part of the lessor when he demises dangerous
property has nothing to do with the relation of landlord and tenant; it is
the ordinary case of liability for the breach of a duty, which runs through
all the relations of individuals to each other.'8 The instance afforded by
the breach by the lessor of a covenant to repair is but one phase of it, and
cannot be considered otherwise than as a part of the larger problem. 5 The
modern tendency is to make the fundamental nature of the obligation the
test as to whether the action is founded upon either contract or tort.20 In
other words, the particular facts which bring two persons into a relation-
ship to each other are not necessarily controlling, but the true test is,
speaking generally, being in that relationship, are the circumstances such
that one, in the performance of some act within the scope of that relation-
ship, unless he uses proper care, is likely to do injury to the person, prop-
erty, or the rights of the other.21 Brett, M. R. states the principle thus: 22
"Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would
at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of in-
jury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger." It is in this sense that negligence
grows out of contracts, as nuisance may grow out of negligence.23
J. L. A. '37.
15 Collins v. Goetz (1931) 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397; Cavalier v. Pope
(1906) A. C. 428; Pollock, Torts (13th Ed.) 532; Salmond, Torts (7th Ed.)
477.
'a See cases supra, note 15.
17 Dean v. Hershowitz (Conn. 1935) 177 Atl. 262.
'8 Wilcox v. Hines (1898) 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S. W. 297, 41 L. R. A. 278;
Kilmer v. White (1930) 254 N. Y. 64, 117 N. E. 908.
19 See supra, note 18.
20 Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, 86 and 87.
2 3Maltby, C. J., in Dean v. Hershowitz (Conn. 1935) 177 At]. 262.
Pollock, Torts 554.
22 Heaven v. Pender (1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503.
23 Hoffman v. Bristol (1931) 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499, 75 A. L. R. 1191.
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